Views:4192
gazoprovod

  The Russian government can do little to undermine the competitiveness of alternative supplies along the Southern Gas Corridor. Moreover, the suppliers’ list is rapidly expanding with new gas fields in the Azeri offshore of the Caspian (Absheron and Shah Deniz 3), Turkmenistan (swaps already under way via Iran with Azerbaijan), Iran, Northern Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean. All this clearly alludes to the feasibility of alternative gas exports via Greece and Bulgaria to the rest of the EU. Gazprom’s nightmares are just starting to mature as soaring production and transportation costs within Russia do not leave much room for further cost-cutting.   Militarizing the Caspian Sea   To block the development and export of Caspian gas, including via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Moscow decided to relocate its flotilla from Astrakhan

Views:2183
gaz

  The need to move beyond the Balkan Gas Hub “Russia-only” or “Russia-mainly” paradigm seems indispensable if the ‘hub’ project – in the broad sense – has any chance.   The talk of billions of cubic meters of natural gas from non-Russian sources deserves a serious look to the north, but mostly to the south – The Southern Gas Corridor.   Yet what seems logical to everyone, does not inspire the management of the TSO of the Bulgarian gas system. The fact that none of these routes – TANAP, TAP or the Greek-Bulgaria Interconnector – contain specific numbers for potential gas flows makes things seem pre-ordained. The BGH essentially seems to be conceived as a redistribution center for Russian gas.   The likelihood of non-Russian gas emerging both at the

Views:6190
Gazprom

  No wonder German, French and British energy companies grumbled upon the release of the new version of S.722  – the legislation expanding US sanctions on Iran and Russia. In part for a good reason – there were nuances, which the US Senators failed to address in the original version.   As Russian and Iranian companies hold shares in Shah Deniz – 2 (NIOC and Lukoil own 10 per cent shares) a verbatim application of the provisions of the US sanctions act would have essentially blocked the Shah Deniz project and the whole Southern Gas Corridor.   In the new draft, the sanctions apply only to companies and projects where Russian companies hold at least a 33% stake.   This change was expected as many governments, companies and the EC

Views:3107
1.1

  One of the greatest challenges we face today is to understand the trends and reap the benefits of change in a rapidly evolving world.   Just a decade ago, leaders in south and southeastern Europe believed that breaking away from Gazprom’s monopoly meant they needed to connect to the Caspian Sea gas finds. The second phase of the Shah Deniz-2 project was considered the Holy Grail of energy independence for SEE countries – a belief that led to the strategic project of the Southern Gas Corridor, the development of the second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field and the construction of costly transport infrastructure, worth in total more than $45 billion.   In the original plan these investments were meant to be recovered via gas sales with 9

Views:4708
gazoprovod

  Recent weeks have provided exemplary cases of the impact of Bulgaria’s high political risk on major projects and gas prices. The caretaker government exacerbates the situation; there is no parliament to control and preempt shady deals, and the gravity of public life and media attention is focused on the elections. Few if any would notice a change at the top of state companies or projects or an unprecedented gas price hike – almost 30% – a record in Bulgaria’s modern history.   The perpetrators of such backdoor policies understand that under open, transparent and functioning market conditions such drastic price swings would be impossible. Even if oil moves up or down in an unpredictable manner, and this is not the case, the interplay between the multitude of gas traders

Views:2983
gazoprovod

Shortly after the ratification of the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkey on Turkish Stream, analysts embarked on understanding the implications of Russian gas entering the Southern Gas Corridor. The emphasis was placed on the role and interplay between the Russian gas monopoly and its European partners in marketing and selling surplus gas flows that emerge at Turkey’s borders with EU states Greece and Bulgaria. There is an even more specific angle to explore – the impact of Russian gas on the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which starts on the Greek-Turkish border and ends up in Italy.   TAP plays an instrumental role in the EC’s drive to diversify and liberalize the SE and SEE regional gas markets and more poignantly to attract alternative gas supplies across a wide range of producers